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for bonds by imposing deadlines on their convertibility. We show that Confederate funding acts
aimed at precipitating the conversion of currency into bonds did temporarily suppress currency
depreciation. These acts also triggered upsurges in commodity prices, however, as note holders
rushed to spend the currency before their exchange rights were reduced. Asset price stabilization
policies seem to have increased the velocity of circulation and counterproductively channeled
inflationary pressures into other areas of the economy.
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The absorption of Treasury notes by the funding process is progressing favorably, and will
counteract the tendency to a further depreciation of our currency arising from the heavy
issues since the 1
st of January last.
(Richmond Dispatch, April 15, 1863)
During the Civil War commodity prices rose in the Confederacy while the gold value of
Confederate currency and bonds declined.  The rate of asset price inflation lagged behind commodity price
inflation, however, and there was a greater than 2:1 divergence at the time of two Confederate financial
reforms aimed at encouraging exchanges of currency into bonds.  These exchanges raised the demand for
bonds and boosted bond prices while also supporting the gold value of the currency as the supply of money
was reduced.   But the period between the announcement and implementation of these reforms saw upward
surges in commodity prices with no matching depreciation in the value of the currency against gold.  This
suggests that the reforms may have channeled inflationary pressures into commodity markets and that an
examination of both asset and commodity markets is needed in order to assess the effectiveness of
Confederate monetary policy.  Just as Bernanke and Gertler (1999) criticize the Bank of Japan for focusing
on asset price inflation at the expense of the general price level in the 1989-1997 period so too may
Confederate monetary policy have been directed too much towards stabilizing asset markets with less
favorable consequences for the prices of other goods and services.
The bursts of commodity price inflation after the reforms were announced suggest that individuals
exchanged money for goods as well as for bonds in the run up to the deadline.  A real balance effect seems
to have operated whereby decreased demand for the old money created excess cash balances that were
translated at least in part into an excess demand for goods.  Even after the financial reforms reduced the
total money supply, the initial surges in commodity price inflation were never fully reversed.   There was,
in fact, a boost to wealth holdings when the reforms took effect insofar as the stocks of money being retired2
were exchanged for bonds at par -- even though these bonds were then trading at a premium.  In this way
consumption expenditures may well have been fueled by the gains on the bonds when the exchange
occurred.  Despite the questions concerning the relative weights that should be attached to bond holdings
and money balances as components of private sector net financial assets (see, for example, Patinkin, 1965,
pp. 289-290), the changes in the level and market value of bond holdings surely cannot be ignored in the
Confederate case.  This is especially so given the existence of a ready market for the bonds received with
no restrictions on reselling.
From the outset, Confederate currency and bond markets were linked by the fact that note holders
enjoyed an imbedded call option on Confederate government bonds.  Non-interest-bearing Confederate
Treasury notes were issued with the proviso that holders could, at their pleasure, exchange these notes for
8% government bonds at par.  This call option would naturally become increasingly valuable if the bonds
rose above par and implied that noteholders would be able to participate fully in any bond market rally
even while keeping their funds in the form of highly liquid currency.  The 8% bonds issued under the 1861
$100 million loan (authorized by the Act of August 19, 1861 with a minimum denomination of $100)
generally traded at or below par during 1862, however.  And, with no deadline for the exercise of the
option, there was no incentive for holders of Confederate Treasury notes to actually convert their money
into bonds at that time.  In an attempt to induce -- and ultimately force -- early conversion of money into
bonds the government instituted three funding acts that limited the time period over which Treasury notes
could be exchanged for the higher yielding 8% bonds.  After the deadline, these notes could only be
exchanged for lower yielding bonds -- or in some cases would no longer be convertible at all.
As the funding acts were imposed, Confederate bonds finally rose above par.  And significant
volumes of Treasury notes were exchanged for bonds prior to the deadlines imposed by the respective acts.
 At least by the beginning of 1863, Confederate Secretary Memminger (1863a, pp. 442-45) was clearly
concerned that the initial voluntary exchanges of money for bonds would be insufficient to curb3
inflationary pressures, however, and urged much more draconian steps -- some of which were eventually
adopted under the March 23, 1863 Act:
Prices will reach the height adjusted by the scale of issues, and they can only be restored
to their usual condition by a return to the normal standard of currency.  In other words, the
only remedy for an inflated currency is a reduction of the circulating medium ... I would
respectfully propose that ... the issues of treasury notes bearing date prior to the 1
st
December, 1862 shall cease to be currency ... Hitherto the policy of the government has
sought to absorb the circulation by inducements alone ... It is proposed now to supply the
deficiency by a small portion of constraint.  We see on every side of us indications of the
abundance of money ... 
In this paper we assess the overall consequences of the Confederate funding acts for asset prices
and commodity prices.  We combine newly-collected weekly data on Confederate bond prices with a
weekly series on the gold value of Confederate currency also collected from primary newspaper sources
(see Burdekin and Weidenmier, 2001, and Weidenmier, 2002).
1  We compare our data on currency
depreciation with available monthly data on commodity prices in Richmond (Berry, 1985) and the eastern
Confederacy (Lerner, 1955).   We show that significant reductions in the rate of currency depreciation
followed the implementation of two of the three reforms but also illustrate the surge in commodity prices
that occurs between the announcement and implementation dates.   An acceleration in commodity prices
relative to the gold price of Confederate currency is evident not only for the later  February 17, 1864 Act  -
- that essentially repudiated nearly one-third of the Confederate money stock -- but also for the earlier
October 1862 Act that merely imposed a deadline for exchanging Treasury notes into higher yielding
bonds.  Econometric analysis of the weekly data confirms that there was a significant increase in gold
values when the reforms were implemented.  Only the March 1863 Act did not match this pattern.  This
exception may be partly due to the much smaller quantity of notes actually exchanged for bonds as well as
the fact that the effective date of August 1, 1863 occurred in the aftermath of the Battle of Gettysburg
fought in July 1863.4
I.  The Evolution of Confederate Interest Rate Policy
The first funding act was passed on October 13, 1862.  Notes issued prior to December 1,
1862 could only be exchanged for 8% bonds until a deadline eventually set at April 22, 1863. 
Thereafter these notes, together with all subsequent notes issued after December 1, 1862, would
be exchangeable only for 7% bonds.
2  The effects of this Act on the demand for money appeared
to be well-anticipated by Confederate Treasury Secretary Memminger in his letter of October 6,
1862 to President Davis:
If after a certain date no 8 per cent bonds be issued, except to fulfill existing
contracts, it is obvious that the currency now in circulation would have an
advantage over that afterwards issued, and the effect would be a general effort on
the part of moneyed men to get possession of ... those notes that were fundable in
bonds at the higher rate of interest.
3
 As the 8% funding deadline approached, the older notes still convertible into 8% bonds prior to
April 22 did indeed rise to a premium against the newer notes that were exchangeable only into
7% bonds.  The Richmond Dispatch (April 15, 1863) states that these older notes were “in
demand” and trading at a more than 2% premium.  The day before the deadline the old notes
were still being offered at a 1% premium to the new notes but, with their exchangeability into 8%
bonds about to end, “most of the brokers declined to buy” (Richmond Dispatch, April 22, 1863).
 This implies not only that holders attached significant value to the right to exchange notes for
8% bonds rather than 7% bonds but also that the right to exchange Treasury notes for bonds at
par was still viewed as a valuable option in the spring of 1863.  
After the act took effect, the impact on commodity prices was noted by the Richmond
Dispatch (April 16, 1863):5
During the past few days, a downward tendency in the prices of nearly all articles
of merchandise has been developed–the chief cause of which, as heretofore stated,
is the reduction of the amount of currency by the rapid funding of Treasury notes.
The gold value of the currency also rose in late April 1863.  The Richmond Dispatch (April 29,
1863) noted that the “rate of premium for specie has undergone a decided decline since our last
report.”  At the same time,  the value of the 8% bonds in terms of Confederate currency rose
substantially and during the second half of April 1863 these bonds climbed to a 10% premium
(see Data Appendix). The period between the announcement of the funding act in October 1862
and its implementation in April 1863 was marked by a burst of commodity price inflation,
however.  The growth of commodity prices -- as measured both by the Lerner and Berry price
indices -- over and above our currency price index for the price of a gold dollar in terms of
Confederate Treasury notes can be seen in Figure 1.  The Lerner and Berry indices each more
than doubled between October 1862 and April 1863.   The ratios of these two commodity price
indices to the currency index also rose sharply after November 1862, and there is a greater than
2:1 differential during April 1863 – see Figure 2 and the Data Appendix.  Both ratios later briefly
went back to just above 1:1 in August 1863 prior to embarking on a renewed upward trends.
4  
The disparate reactions of currency and commodity prices to the first funding act suggests that
inflationary pressures were heavily channeled into commodity prices and offers support for
Lerner’s (1954, p. 516) argument that the Confederate funding acts boosted the velocity of
circulation as note holders sought to unload their notes before their exchange rights were reduced
under the terms of the funding acts.  As noted earlier, this is also consistent with the direct link
between money and spending implied by the real balance effect. 6
In the face of rapid issuance of new notes needed to fund the Confederacy’s military
efforts in 1863, a second funding act was passed even before the first act had taken effect.  Under
the Funding Act of March 23, 1863 the right to exchange Treasury notes for even 7% bonds was
to end on August 1, 1863.  After that date, notes issued prior to December 1, 1862 would not be
fundable in bonds at all while notes issued after December 1, 1862 would be fundable only in 4%
30-year bonds.  The imposition of this new funding deadline again reportedly had a significant
impact on Confederate money markets.  The Richmond Dispatch (August 4, 1863) states:
As the time within which the old issues of Treasury notes were fundable has
expired, they have been refused since 1
st August by a number of persons who
continued to receive them up to that date.  Fortunately there are not many afloat
here, and persons holding them need not fear any loss, as the Confederate tax
collectors will soon afford the means for retiring them from circulation.  Let
everybody pay taxes in the old notes, and get them out of the way.
  
Todd (1954, p. 72) estimates, however, that the second funding act withdrew only $21
million in Treasury notes  from circulation in exchange for bonds.
5  The total for the first act was
much higher with Todd (1954, p. 67) stating that more than $163 million in notes were
withdrawn form circulation.
6  Godfrey (1978, p. 120) summarizes the overall impact of the first
two acts as follows:
Prior to the funding, nearly every dollar of currency issued by the Confederate
government added a dollar to currency in circulation and thereby, to the money
stock.  However, funding reduced the volume of Confederate currency in
circulation.  Between mid-February 1862 and January 1863, the Confederate
Treasury issued $389 million in currency, and the volume in circulation rose
slightly over 90 percent of this amount.  This contrasts with the following nine
months when Treasury notes issued rose $415 million, but notes in circulation
were up only $245 million.  Notes in circulation increased only about 60 percent
of the notes issued. . .  Of course, the volume of Treasury notes removed from
circulation by funding accounts for the difference. . . The Confederate Treasury
issued more notes in the latter period but increased the money supply less because
a significant amount of the notes were converted into long-term bonds.7
Notwithstanding the effects of the funding acts, the overall supply of non-interest-bearing
notes in circulation still expanded from $289 million at the beginning of 1863 to more than $720
million by January 1, 1864.  The premium on the 8% bonds in terms of Confederate currency
rose mildly to around 15% at the end of 1863.  But the gold premium began to soar in late 1863,
reaching 20:1 in Richmond on January 2, 1864 (Burdekin and Weidenmier, 2001).  As a last
resort, the Confederate government passed the February 17, 1864 Act that mandated that most
Confederate Treasury notes then outstanding be exchanged for 4% bonds by April 1, 1864 or else
face a 33 1/3 % “tax.”  (The deadline was extended to July 1, 1864 west of the Mississippi.)  The
premium on the 8% bonds east of the Mississippi was driven up to 25% after this Act was passed
and the gold value of Treasury notes also rose.  In contrast to previous measures whereby the
funding of notes for bonds had quickly been more than offset by issues of new notes, the 1864
Act produced an overnight near-one-third shrinkage in the Confederate money supply east of the
Mississippi in April 1864.
As with the first act, however, there was a surge in commodity prices in the period
between the announcement of this new act in February 1864 and its implementation in April
1864.  Indeed, even though the gold price of Confederate currency increased by only 2% over this
period, Lerner’s index increased by over 51% and Berry’s index increased by over 43%.  For
Lerner’s index, the ratio of commodity prices to currency prices increased from 1.31 in February
1864 to 1.94 in April 1864 before peaking at 2.54 in May.  In terms of Berry’s index, the ratio
accelerated from 1.61 in February to 2.26 in April before, again, peaking in May.  Although each
of the commodity and currency indices then fell until at least August 1864 – with the decline8
continuing until October 1864 in the case of Lerner’s index – only the currency index ever
dropped below its February 1864 level.  As far as commodity prices are concerned, it appears
that the subsequent deflationary effects of the reduced money stock never entirely offset the
initial inflationary effects of increased velocity of circulation.  And the Confederacy’s success in
effectively supporting the gold value of Confederate assets came at the expense of initially
channeling strong inflationary pressures into the commodity markets.
The gold premium itself remained below the February 1864 level until September 1864
and did not rise significantly until November 1864, by which time expanding new issues of
Confederate Treasury notes reversed the temporary decline in the money supply effected by the
February 1864 Act.  Memminger’s replacement as Treasury Secretary, Trenholm (1864, p. 6)
accurately summarized the bleak situation near the end of the war:  “Unless a uniform and stable
value can be given to the treasury notes, the effort to carry on the war through their
instrumentality, must of necessity be abandoned.”  Thereafter even direct government
intervention in the gold market in early 1865 could not arrest the accelerating rate of currency
depreciation that continued until Confederate currency was rendered essentially worthless with
the surrenders of General Lee and General Johnston in April 1865.
II.  Quantifying the Effects of the Funding Acts on Confederate Asset Prices
We identify a consistent relationship between the gold price of Confederate currency and
the gold price of Confederate bonds.
7  Using new weekly data on bond prices collected from
contemporary Richmond, Wilmington and Mobile newspapers we first show in Figure 3 the
rising trend of the gold yields on Confederate bonds.  As with Davis and Pequet (1990) – whose9
analysis focused only on monthly bond data – these are yields to maturity calculated based on an
1881 end-date.
8  Figure 4 plots the gold price of the 1861 $100 million dollar loan and the gold
price of Confederate currency between January 1862 and January 1865.
9  The two series appear
to move together both in the pre-May 1864 period and also over the remaining July 1864-January
1865 period for which data on both series exist.  Empirical testing can only be employed over the
January 1862-April 1864 portion of the sample, however, owing to the lack of bond price quotes
during May and June 1864.  In the face of the vast bond issues required once the February 17,
1864 took effect in the eastern Confederacy on April 1, 1864, regular bond quotes temporarily
disappear in the Richmond newspapers (and those of other major Southern cities) until July
1864.   
Consistent with the near-perfect correlation evident in Figure 4, Johansen maximum
likelihood tests show the gold price of the bonds and the gold price of Confederate currency to be
cointegrated between January 1862 and March 1864 (see Table 1).  The existence of a one-to-one
relationship between bond prices and currency prices can be rejected at better than the 99%
confidence level, however.
10  Thus, at least up until March 1864, holders apparently did not view
money and bonds as perfect substitutes – implying also that they were not yet convinced that all
the bonds would be monetized eventually.  Based on the long-run equilibrium relationship
uncovered by the cointegration testing, we then estimate error-correction equations for the
change in the gold value of the bonds and the change in the gold price of Confederate currency. 
Lagged values of the changes in these two variables are entered on the right-hand-side of each
equation together with a constant and the error-correction term.  We initially add a dummy
variable for each of the three funding acts, a war dummy for Northen victories (defined as +1 for10
a major Union victory and zero otherwise) and a war dummy for Southern victories (defined as
+1 for a major Confederate victory and zero otherwise).
11  A list of the battles is provided in
Table 2 (see also Weidenmier, 2002).  The dummies for the funding acts are set equal to +1 for
the week leading up to the funding deadline that was imposed and zero otherwise.
12  The
expected sign on the Northern dummy is negative but the expected sign on each other dummy
variable is positive as the funding acts and favorable war news should all raise the gold value of
Confederate financial instruments, ceteris paribus.  We also re-ran the regression with each of
the battles entered individually so as to avoid imposing the restriction that each Northern or
Southern victory had an equal-sized effect.
Table 3 sets out the reaction of money and bond price changes to the deviations from
long-run equilibrium represented by the error-correction term, the reform dummies and the
grouped Northern and Southern victories (labeled “North” and “South”, respectively).  Although
the money price response is insignificant, the bond price response is significant at the 5% level. 
The relatively large coefficient of -0.755 on the error-correction term implies rapid bond market
adjustment back towards the long-run equilibrium -- with just over three-quarters of the
adjustment completed within one week.  Money and bond prices also respond significantly to the
funding acts and to war news.  There is a large shift in gold values at the time of the first funding
act that took effect in April 1863.  The results suggest that there was an approximate 12% boost
to the gold value of Confederate 8% bonds at that time and a 9.5% boost to the gold value of
Confederate Treasury notes.  These coefficients are similar in size to those associated with the
Northern war dummy, which like the first reform dummy is significant at the 5% level or better
in both the bond equation and the currency equation.  The insignificance of the Southern war11
dummy, meanwhile, implies that (contrary to McCandless, 1996) the effects of war news were
asymmetric – perhaps because, in the absence of a decisive victory on Northern soil, the given
Confederate victories were not seen as hastening a favorable end to the conflict.  The 1864
Currency Reform also has the expected positive sign but is significant only at the 10% level in
the bond and money equations.  The indicated effects remain surprisingly strong, however, given
that the 1864 reform takes effect only in the last month of the sample period, making any such
shift hard to detect econometrically.
13
Re-running the regression with the 12 battles entered individually generally has little
effect on either the size or significance of the coefficients associated with the reform dummies. 
The third reform dummy does now, however, fall just below the 10% significance level in the
money equation.  The implied adjustment speed decreases slightly as the coefficient on the error-
correction term declines from -0.755 to -0.666.  But this still implies that approximately two-
thirds of the adjustment takes place within the first week.  The results for the battle dummies
themselves confirm the earlier inference that there is no positive impact of Confederate victories.
 None of the dummies for the Seven Days Battles around Richmond, Second Manassas,
Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville or Chickamauga is significant at even the 10% level.
14 
Meanwhile, among the Northern victories, Gettysburg/Vicksburg and Sharpsburg (Antietam)
produce large negative effects that are in each case significant at the 1% level.  The strong effects
apparently associated with these two battles are consistent with them typically being considered
to form major turning points in the Civil War (see also Weidenmier, 2002).12
We have not so far discussed the dummy for the second reform act, which took effect on
August 1, 1863, however.  This dummy is itself significant either at the 10% level -- or, in one
case, at the 5% level -- in the bond and money equations in Tables 3 and 4, but has the wrong
(negative) sign.  We believe that the explanation for the seemingly-perverse effects
accompanying the implementation of the second funding act lies not only in the relatively small
number of notes actually exchanged for bonds but also in its coming on the heels of news of
Confederate defeat at the Battle of Gettysburg in July 1863.  Although our war dummies capture
the immediate impact of news of this defeat, more persistent negative effects on Confederate
financial instruments held abroad are demonstrated by Brown and Burdekin (2000) and
Weidenmier (2000).  Whereas Confederate cotton bonds traded in London and Confederate
bonds traded in Amsterdam begin a months’ long plunge of over 30% after Gettysburg, the gold
values of domestic Confederate bonds and Confederate currency actually remain quite stable
between August and November 1863.  The Confederate bonds held abroad were not subject in
any way to the provisions of the funding acts.  Therefore their extended decline in value in the
latter half of 1863 may offer a rough counterfactual of what would have happened to the gold
value of domestically-held Confederate currency and bonds in the absence of the funding acts.  In
other words, the second funding act may still have at least blunted the depreciation in the gold
value of domestically-held Confederate financial instruments that followed the Battle of
Gettysburg.
Support for this view arises from the price movements for sterling bills of exchange
during 1863.  These bills represented exchanges of Confederate currency for the future delivery
of pounds sterling – usually 60 days after the bill was drawn up.  The premium for sterling in13
terms of Confederate currency rose with the expected rate of Confederate currency depreciation. 
Table 5 reports all available quotes for 60-day sterling drafts that could be located in the National
Archives.   A continued uptrend in the sterling premium is evident in the data for 1861 and 1862.
 After reaching 200 on December 30, 1862 the premium increases only slightly to 230 on April 6,
1863.  But the next quotation from July 22, 1863 shows a near doubling of the premium.  This
greatly increased premium occurs in the aftermath of the Battle of Gettysburg and appears to be
consistent with the quite devastating declines evident in Confederate bonds that were traded
abroad.  We can only conclude that the estimated coefficient on the dummy for the second
funding act conflates positive effects of the second funding act on domestically-held bonds with
the continued negative effects of the Gettysburg defeat evident in other Confederate financial
instruments.
III.  Conclusions
By imposing deadlines on convertibility into higher yielding bonds the government was
able to induce substantial exchanges of money for bonds.  We present evidence that at least two
out of the three  Confederate funding acts were effective in temporarily suppressing the rate of
currency depreciation.  These acts also triggered upsurges in commodity prices, however, as note
holders rushed to spend the currency before their exchange rights were reduced.  The widening
gap between commodity and asset prices following the passage of the first and third acts is
consistent with the rising velocity of circulation noted by Lerner (1954).  Confederate asset price
stabilization policies seem, therefore, to have initially channeled inflationary pressures into other
areas of the economy -- with decreased money demand being translated, at least in part, into an14
excess demand for goods.  The declining prices after the acts took effect must therefore be set
against the preceding sharp run-up in prices after the monetary reforms were announced.15
Footnotes
1.  Past research has been hampered by the lack of a reliable series on the gold value of
Confederate currency with, for example, McCandless (1996) relying upon a newspaper
column of unknown origin that differs significantly from actual trades reported in
contemporary Richmond papers.
2.  As Congress had neglected to provide the Secretary of the Treasury with the authority to
issue the bonds called for under the October 13, 1862 Act, the first Act had to be
supplemented with a further Act of February 20, 1863 so as to allow the new bonds to be
issued (Todd (1954, p. 66). 
3.  Quoted in Todd (1954, p. 66).  Memminger (1863a), in his Treasury Report of January
10, 1863, also pointed out that rapid depreciation of the notes in which the interest on the
bonds was paid had been reducing the incentive to convert by lowering the real return:
“Bonds at a high rate of interest have been offered; but the inducement has been abated
by the depreciation of the currency in which the interest is paid” (see Capers, 1893, p.
445).
4.  This closing of the gap may well reflect arbitrage between the relatively cheaper gold and
the relatively more expensive commodities.  At the very least, there is more to this picture
than the effects of progressive supply shortages that, while potentially helping to account
for a widening of the gap, could scarcely explain its subsequent closure. 
5.  The new notes issued in 1863 were to be fundable in 6% bonds for the first year and
thereafter would be fundable only in 4% bonds.16
6.  Although Memminger (1863b, p. 458) reported that only $65 million in Treasury notes
were funded and cancelled between January 1, 1863 and September 30, 1863, Todd’s
figures are based on Thian’s (1878) exhaustive analysis of the primary Treasury records.
7.  We do not attempt econometric analysis with the commodity price indices as the monthly
data yields too limited a number of observations. 
8.  Davis and Pecquet (1990) stress the importance of substitution between call certificates
and bonds and point to the existence of an approximate 2% premium on the bonds over
much of the 1862-1864 period.  The role played by call certificates changed substantially
when their free exchangeability for Treasury notes ended under the March 23, 1863 Act,
however.  As Todd (1954, pp. 70-71) points out: “All call certificates of every
description, outstanding after July 1, 1863, were to be considered bonds ... [and] every
certificate not reconverted within six months ... was to be exchanged for 6% 30-year
bonds.”
9.  Although we have seen no references to these bonds actually circulating, they were
nevertheless viewed as liquid financial instruments with active secondary markets (Davis
and Pecquet, 1990).
10.  This finding holds even if we include the reform dummies in the cointegrating space in
addition to their existing role as short-run shift factors. 
11.  The rationale for adding these war dummies is that negative war news could signal
greater expected future money growth and/or a higher probability that the bond issues
would have to be entirely monetized in the future.17
12.  The reform dummies are not defined for the earlier post-announcement period because
there are no economic rationale for option holders to exercise the option prior to the
expiry date (Copeland and Weston, 1988, pp. 253-255). 
13.  The potency of the 1864 Act is, however, convincingly demonstrated by the contrasting
experience of the eastern Confederacy vs. that of the Trans-Mississippi.  The Act took
effect three months later in the Trans-Mississippi and the temporary reversal of the
depreciation of Confederate currency was also similarly delayed (see Burdekin and
Weidenmier, 2001).
14.  In the case of Chancellorsville the dummy also likely captures word of General
“Stonewall” Jackson’s death on May 11, 1863 from wounds received by friendly fire on
the evening of May 2 -- thus conflating negative news with the favorable outcome of the
battle itself.  18
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Johansen Maximum Likelihood Tests for Cointegration
     Null Alternative    Test                       95%
Hypothesis Hypothesis  Statistic Critical  Value 
TRACE tests TRACE  value
    r = 0 r > 0  20.13        15.197
 
MAX tests MAX value
    r = 0 r = 1  19.70                    14.036
lag length of VAR = 4
r = number of cointegrating vectors
Long-Run Equilibrium Relationship
BOND = 0.922MONEY
Test of the Restriction of a One-to-One Linkage between Money and Bonds
Chisqr(1) = 20.92
p-value = .000
Note:  Critical Values for the Johansen cointegration tests are obtained from Osterwald-
Lenum, 1992. Table 2
Some Major Military Events of the US Civil War
January 1862 – April 1864
Date Battle Victor
April 6-7, 1862 Pittsburgh Landing (Shiloh) North
Late April 1862 Fall of New Orleans North
Late June – Early July, 1862 Seven Days South
August 30, 1862 Second Manassas (Bull Run) South
September 17-19, 1862 Sharpsburg (Antietam) North
December 11-15, 1862 Fredericksburg South
December 31 – Jan. 2, 1863 Murfreesboro (Stones River) North
May 2, 1863 Chancellorsville South
July 1-3, 1863 Gettysburg North
July 4, 1863 Vicksburg North
September 19-20, 1863 Chickamauga South
November 25, 1863 Chattanooga NorthTable 3
Basic Cointegration Model Results
Variable      Bond Equation Money Equation
Constant  0.187  0.066
(2.071)** (0.732)
Speed of -0.755 -0.337
Adjustment (-2.364)** (-1.052)
















Moneyt-1  0.173 -0.006
(0.441) (-0.016)
Moneyt-2  0.897  0.913
(2.199)** (2.228)**
Moneyt-3  0.185  0.064
(0.511) (0.176)
where t-statistics are in parentheses, and
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectivelyTable 4
Cointegration Model with Separate Dummies for Each Major Battle
Variable      Bond Equation Money Equation
Constant  0.161  0.034
(1.828)* (0.383)
Speed of -0.666 -0.227
Adjustment (-2.130)** (-0.718)




Reform3  0.062  0.057
(1.763)* (1.591)
Pittsburgh Landing (Shiloh)  0.015  0.008
(0.264) (0.138)
Fall of New Orleans             -0.083 -0.081
(-1.187) (-1.144)
Seven Days  0.058  0.061
(0.742) (0.770)
Second Manassas (Bull Run)  0.006 -0.004
(0.090) (-0.061)
Sharpsburg (Antietam)  -0.185 -0.181
(-3.232)*** (-3.129)***
Fredericksburg  0.028  0.038
(0.393) (0.535)
Murfreesboro (Stones River)  0.080  0.090
(1.140) (1.271)
Chancellorsville              0.001 -0.004
(0.029) (-0.067)Gettysburg/Vicksburg -0.168 -0.152
(-3.212)*** (-2.869)***








Bondt-3 -0.132  -0.057
(-0.386) (-0.165)
Moneyt-1  0.181   0.020
(0.483) (0.052)
Moneyt-2  0.690   0.743
(1.694)* (1.805)*
Moneyt-3  0.148  0.039
(0.436) (0.113)
All models were tested for serial correlation at various lag lengths using Box-Ljung and
LM tests.  The null hypothesis of no autocorrelation could not be rejected. (Also see
notes to Table 3.)Table 5
Premium on Sterling Bills of Exchange May 1861 - July 1863
1861 Premium 1863 Premium
April 18 9 January 5 195
May 2 par January 6 200
May 11 par April 6 230


















Sources:  Thian (1878, pp. 83-84); Record of Civil and Miscellaneous Warrants of the
Confederate Government of the Fiscal Year 1862-1863; Record of Civil Warrants
January 1, 1863 - December 31, 1863.Figure 1





























































































































































































































Dashed lines denote 
dates when the Acts
were passed; Solid 
lines denote dates 
when the Acts took
effect.Figure 2









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fall of AtlantaFigure 4



























































































































































































































































































































MONEYData Appendix: Confederate Bond Prices of the 100 Million Dollar Loan
1862
January 17 100 July 18 100 January 9 100
January 24 100 July 25 100 January 16 100
January 31 100 August 1 100 January 23 100
February 7 100 August 8 100 January 30 100
February 14 100 August 15 100 February 6 100
February 21 99 August 22 100 February 13 100
February 28 99.25 August 29 100 February 20 100
March 7 99 September 5 100 February 27 100
March 14 99 September 12 100 March 6 100.5
March 21 99 September 19 100 March 13 100
March 28 95 September 26 100 March 20 103
April 4 97 October 3 100 March 27 100
April 11 97 October 10 100 April 3 105
April 18 97 October 17 100 April 10 106
April 25 97 October 24 100 April 17 110
May 2 97 October 31 100 April 24 110
May 9 95 November 7 100 May 1 109.5
May 16 92.5 November 14 100 May 8 109
May 23 95 November 21 100 May 15 109
May 30 95 November 28 100 May 22 109
June 6 95 December 5 100 May 29 109
June 13 92.5 December 12 100 June 5 109
June 20 100 December 19 100 June 12 106
June 27 92.5 December 26 100 June 19 109.5
July 4 97 1863 June 26 103
July  11 97 January 2 100 July 3 109July 10 109.5 January 15 117 September 30 115
July 17 110 January 22 119 October 7 110
July 24 108 January 29 117 October 14 120
July 31 103 February 5 117 October 21 125
August 7 111 February 12 125.5 October 28 120
August 14 111 February 19 126 November 4 120
August 21 111.5 February 26 125.5 November 11 120
August 28 111 March 4 120 November 18 120
September 4 111.5 March 11 115.5 November 25 125
September 11 111.5 March 18 114 December 2 125
September 18 111.5 March 25 118 December 9 122.5
September  25 111.5 April 1 125 December 16 125
October 2 111.5 April 8 125 December 23 127.5
October 9 111.5 April 15 125 December 30 127.5
October 16 112.5 April 22 125 1865
October 23 112.5 April 29 110 January 6 125
October 30 113 Reform Act January 13 110
November 6 113 July 15 114
November 13 113 July 22 118
November 20 112 July 29 118
November 27 113 August 5 115
December 4 114 August 12 115
December 11 114 August 19 115
December 18 114.5 August 26 115
December 25 115 September 2 122
1864 September 9 129
January 1 114 September 16 124
January 8 114 September 23 130.5Confederate Price Indices
Lerner Price Index Berry Price Index Currency Index Lerner/Currency Berry/Currency
1861/1 101.00 96.00 100.00 1.01 0.96
1861/2 99.00 100.00 100.00 0.99 1.00
1861/3 101.00 99.00 100.00 1.01 0.99
1861/4 101.00 103.00 100.00 1.01 1.03
1861/5 109.00 104.00 100.00 1.09 1.04
1861/6 109.00 108.00 100.00 1.09 1.08
1861/7 111.00 121.00 100.00 1.11 1.21
1861/8 120.00 124.00 100.00 1.20 1.24
1861/9 128.00 134.00 115.00 1.11 1.17
1861/10 136.00 154.00 115.00 1.18 1.34
1861/11 161.00 164.00 120.00 1.34 1.37
1861/12 172.00 187.00 130.00 1.32 1.44
1862/1 193.00 178.00 130.00 1.48 1.37
1862/2 211.00 186.00 140.00 1.51 1.33
1862/3 236.00 203.00 150.00 1.57 1.35
1862/4 281.00 220.00 176.00 1.60 1.25
1862/5 278.00 297.00 200.00 1.39 1.49
1862/6 331.00 285.00 200.00 1.66 1.43
1862/7 380.00 324.00 200.00 1.90 1.62
1862/8 419.00 330.00 210.00 2.00 1.57
1862/9 493.00 438.00 240.00 2.05 1.83
1862/10 526.00 528.00 240.00 2.19 2.20
1862/11 624.00 549.00 330.00 1.89 1.66
1862/12 686.00 584.00 325.00 2.11 1.80
1863/1 762.00 631.00 310.00 2.46 2.04
1863/2 900.00 912.00 330.00 2.73 2.76
1863/3 1051.00 1154.00 550.00 1.91 2.10
1863/4 1178.00 1284.00 550.00 2.14 2.33
1863/5 1279.00 1388.00 650.00 1.97 2.14
1863/6 1308.00 1340.00 850.00 1.54 1.58
1863/7 1326.00 1488.00 1000.00 1.33 1.49
1863/8 1428.00 1429.00 1300.00 1.10 1.10
1863/9 1617.00 1461.00 1300.00 1.24 1.12
1863/10 1879.00 1646.00 1250.00 1.50 1.32
1863/11 2236.00 2110.00 1675.00 1.33 1.26
1863/12 2464.00 2020.00 1800.00 1.37 1.12
1864/1 2801.00 2670.00 2200.00 1.27 1.21
1864/2 2947.00 3624.00 2250.00 1.31 1.61
1864/3 4128.00 4146.00 2200.00 1.88 1.88
1864/4 4470.00 5200.00 2300.00 1.94 2.26
1864/5 4575.00 5788.00 1800.00 2.54 3.22
1864/6 4198.00 4993.00 1700.00 2.47 2.94
1864/7 4094.00 5632.00 1700.00 2.41 3.31
1864/8 4097.00 4488.00 1900.00 2.16 2.36
1864/9 4279.00 5208.00 2300.00 1.86 2.26
1864/10 4001.00 5344.00 2300.00 1.74 2.32
1864/11 4029.00 5274.00 2800.00 1.44 1.88
1864/12 4285.00 3475.00 1.23 0.00
1865/1 5824.00 5000.00 1.16 0.00